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ESSAYS
LOSING THE PRESUMPTION OF MARKET
POWER FOR ANTITRUST PURPOSES, AND ITS
AFFECT ON THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY*
Regina A. DeMeot
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, antitrust laws and intellectual property rights
were thought to be antagonistic. It is now readily recognized, how-
ever, that both are vital to an efficient economy: intellectual property
rights protect innovation, and antitrust laws ensure that markets will
remain open to all interested competitors. Nevertheless, as antitrust
law currently stands, market power is defined as the power to control
prices, or to exclude competition. Relying on this definition of mar-
ket power, courts developed an automatic presumption of market
power for cases involving the intellectual property rights of an indi-
vidual or entity.1 This presumption that intellectual property rights
automatically confer market power, however, is based on false as-
sumptions2 and thus unduly punishes holders of intellectual property
rights.
* Copyright © 1998 Regina A. DeMeo.
t J.D. 1998, at The George Washington University Law School. All errors and omis-
sions remain those of the author. The author would like to thank her fellow AIPLA Quarterly
Journal publication staff members for their helpful advice and criticism and Benjamin DeMeo
for his insightful comments and encouragement.
1. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984)
(holding that market power may be presumed in a tying agreement involving intellectual prop-
erty rights).
2. Id. at 37 n.7 (O'Connor, J., concuning) (arguing that "a common misconception has
been that a patent or copyright.. .suffices to demonstrate market power.... [however] it is also
possible that a seller in these situations will have no market power: for example, a patent
holder has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented
product.").
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Recognizing the importance of the software industry in the U.S.
economy and the notoriety of our judicial system for lagging behind
technology, Representative Henry Hyde has proposed a bill to elimi-
nate the court-created presumption of market power: The Intellectual
Property Antitrust Protection Act of 1997. The bill's predecessor
(The Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act of 1995) stirred
some controversy within the software industry, and remained under
review in the Judiciary Committee. Thus, in 1997, the bill was rein-
troduced as H.R. 401. This essay intends to clarify the issues sur-
rounding the bill, and hopefully through greater understanding, to
promote support for it.
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF MARKET POWER
While a number of courts have abandoned the presumption of
market power, the Ninth Circuit, for example, has decided to uphold
the presumption of market power.3 One would think that the holder
of an intellectual property right should have absolute control over its
property, and furthermore, that the manufacturer of several products
that are designed to function together should have the right to sell the
products as a unit, in order to preserve the integrity of its total prod-
uct, but alas the Ninth Circuit found this should not be the case. In-
deed, what is most remarkable about the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Digidyne Corp. is its discussion of the irrelevance of a detailed mar-
ket analysis. 4
These issues have not yet been addressed by the Supreme Court,
and so the continued vitality of the presumption doctrine remains un-
certain in our judicial system, meanwhile, the Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission have decided to abandon the pre-
sumption of market power in favor of an economic analysis method;
which determines whether actual market power exists, rather than
presuming it.5 Now, Congress is attempting to eliminate current judi-
cial reliance on the presumption of market power through enactment
of H.R. 401.
3. See Digidyne v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
4. See id. at 1340, n.4.
5. See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,132, at
20,735.
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m. THE ANTITRUST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION ACT OF 1997
H.R. 401 states, in relevant part, that: "[I]n any action in which
the conduct of [the holder] of an intellectual property right is alleged
to be in violation of the antirust laws in connection with the market-
ing or distribution of a product or service protected by such a right,"
that "such right shall not be presumed to define a market, to establish
market power, or to establish monopoly power." '6
Opponents 7 to the elimination of the presumption market power
argue that the bill would upset the balance of competition that has
propelled the high-tech industry of this country into world-wide lead-
ership. In contrast, the supporters8 of the bill believe the presumption
discriminates against intellectual property rights, and may be ad-
versely affecting our economy.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
A. Rule of Reason v. Per Se Illegal Standard
With the bill in effect, companies will be able to interact and
make arrangements more freely, without fear of a presumption of
market power simply based on possession of intellectual property
rights on a certain product. The rule of reason will require courts to
look at the actual market situation to determine if there is actual mar-
ket power. Furthermore, courts must verify that there are actual anti-
competitive effects without adequate business justifications. This is
particularly critical for the software industry, which primarily relies
on intellectual property rights to protect its products, which have a
tendency to be inter-related or inter-dependent. In order to protect
the integrity of their products, and also to adequately profit from their
inventions, software developers need to sell their products in pack-
ages.
The rationale for per se rules is mainly to avoid the difficult task
of analyzing and predicting market conditions. But, a per se con-
demnation of tying arrangements, particularly if applied to the soft-
ware industry, fails to recognize today's economic realities. First, a
6. H.R. 401, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1997).
7. The most visible opponent is the CCIA (Computer and Communications Industry
Association, which enjoys the support of Amdahl Corporation, Sun Microsystems, AT&T,
NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, and the National Association of Independent Television Stations,
among others.
8. Among those supporting the bill (excluding its sponsors) are Data General Corpora-
tion, Coca-Cola, the Licensing Executives Society, and the American Bar Association.
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per se rule ignores whether a seller actually has leverage; substitutes
and the relative market shares of competitors are not considered.
Second, a per se rule does not take into consideration that a purchas-
ing consumer may view two products that are meant to work together
as a single product. Third, the actual fairness of the pricing is not
considered in a per se rule. Fourth, the rule ignores sellers' justifying
arguments, such as technological interdependence, goodwill, eco-
nomic efficiency, or the need to market a package deal in order to
overcome barriers to entry into a certain market.9
Ultimately, a per se prohibition against tie-in arrangements is
unreasonable. Given that the very reason for prohibiting tie-ins was
the concern that they would have a negative impact on consumers, it
seems unreasonable to ignore actual economic conditions when de-
termining if a tie-in arrangement should be condemned. To illustrate
this point, consider the following hypothetical.
B. RAD Corp. - A Hypothetical Case
Imagine RAD Corp., a startup software company, which pro-
vides an electron document delivery service (EDDS). To enhance
this product, it develops an encryption program to guarantee security
when it is used on the Internet. No one else has been able to develop
such a program, so if RAD was able to obtain a copyright on its en-
cryption program, it would in essence have market domination for
encryption software. But, until the EDDS subscriber base constitutes
a significant share of the total EDDS market, RAD does not actually
have market dominance.
Now, if Microsoft approaches RAD and requests a licensing ar-
rangement, so that it may use the encryption software in connection
with Microsoft's EDDS, RAD might be inclined to refuse. From an
economic standpoint, RAD might be much better off exploiting the
fruits of its labor by exclusively providing the encryption software to
users of its EDDS. However, under the Ninth Circuit's theory in
Digidyne, RAD's refusal to license its encryption software, and in-
sistence on providing it exclusively to users of its own EDDS, would
constitute an illegal tying arrangement.
If RAD is forced to license its encryption software, however, it
may essentially lose control over its intellectual property, as licensing
will allow their competitors to profit from RAD's research and de-
9. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957) for an in-depth analysis of tying justifications.
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velopment. The potential profits RAD would have received from the
increase in subscribers to its own EDDS might not be matched by the
amount of royalty or licensing fees it would receive, and eventually
RAD's competitors will be able to alter the encryption program suffi-
ciently to obtain a new copyright in their own right, thereby termi-
nating the need to continue using RAD's program. Meanwhile,
robbed of a sufficient profit to cover its research and development
costs, RAD is likely to be forced out of business.
If a court were required instead to apply the rule of reason, the
outcome would be much different, because the court would have to
conduct a market analysis before condemning RAD's tie-in. Conse-
quently, the reviewing court would consider whether RAD has actual
leverage in the EDDS market. Ultimately, then a rule of reason
would allow the court to decide, in light of all existing factors,
whether the tie-in is anti-competitive and therefore illegal, or simply
provides RAD's EDDS a competitive advantage.
V. CONCLUSION
The court-created presumption of market power ignores actual
market conditions, and unduly burdens holders of intellectual prop-
erty rights, since defendants are required to produce evidence to rebut
the presumption. The Antitrust Intellectual Property Protection Act
of 1997 will eliminate the assumption that intellectual property rights
automatically confer market power, and replace it with a rule of rea-
son based on economic realities.
In order to remove any uncertainties in the law actually ap-
plied - particularly in light of the Ninth Circuit's continued use of
the presumption - it is essential that Congress enact H.R. 401.
The proposed bill is not intended to ease bundling of software,
hardware and other products in aggregate packages that consumers
have come to expect. Rather, it is meant to benefit the computer in-
dustry as well as the consumer market by creating certainty in the law
and removing the current prejudice against holders of intellectual
property rights. Losing the presumption of market power, therefore,
should not be feared, but instead wholeheartedly endorsed.

